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DEFLOWERING Flowers v. Mississippi
Sonya Dickson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Jury service is an important opportunity for citizens to participate in
the democratic process, embracing those who may not otherwise have the
opportunity to be involved with civic life. This opportunity allows
members of the community to exercise their responsibility of citizenship.
A recent survey revealed that two-thirds of American citizens believe
serving on a jury “is part of what it means to be a good citizen.”1
To protect this opportunity, equal justice under law requires that
criminal trials be free from racial discrimination in jury selection process.
Discrimination in the process offends the rights of citizens and defendants
and hinders the integrity of the courts. Despite the efforts of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution to demand fair and equal
treatment to all persons, racial discrimination persisted throughout the
decades, which was due in large to the use of the peremptory strike that
permits exclusion of a juror without explanation. To reconcile this, the
United States Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky developed a framework
that requires parties to offer race-neutral explanations for a contested
strike.2 However, many scholars and commentators have criticized the
decision for its failure to eradicate racial discrimination in jury selection.
Recently, the Supreme Court revisited the application of Fourteenth
Amendment principles to jury selection in Flowers v. Mississippi.3 The
death row case required the Court to review the extraordinary facts
stemming from all of Flowers’ six trials. The Court’s decision hinged on
the single issue of whether the State of Mississippi violated Flowers’
* Sonya Dickson is a 2021 graduate of Mississippi College School of Law.
The author would like to thank Mississippi College School of Law Professor Matthew
Steffey for his support and guidance throughout the drafting of this Comment. The author
would also like to thank her family and friends for all their love, support, and
encouragement.
1. John Gramlich, Jury Duty is Rare, but Most Americans See it as Part of
Good Citizenship, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Aug. 24, 2017),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/24/jury-duty-is-rare-but-mostamericans-see-it-as-part-of-good-citizenship/.
2. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3. Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019).
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Fourteenth Amendment rights by excluding a prospective African
American juror from the jury in his sixth trial. Thus, more than two decades
after Flowers entered death row, the Court reversed his conviction on the
basis that the State’s exercise of a peremptory strike against a prospective
African American juror was largely motivated in part by discriminatory
intent.4
This Note will analyze the holding of Flowers and the current
standard for adjudicating claims of racial discrimination in jury selection.
Part II of this Note discusses the background and history of the law
surrounding the peremptory strike. Specifically, part II addresses the
prevailing standard under Batson and the instant case. Lastly, part III
addresses an analysis of the instant case. Particularly, part III addresses the
ineffectiveness of Batson, as well as the majority’s shortcomings in
assessing the facts of Flowers.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. Equal Protection and Batson v. Kennedy
Ratified in 1868, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “no State shall
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”5
Relying on this underlying principle, the primary purpose of the
Amendment was to provide “freedom of the slave race, the security and
firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made
freeman and citizen from the oppression of those who had formerly
exercised unlimited dominion over him.”6 Thereafter, to help enforce the
Equal Protection Clause, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
making it a criminal offense for state officials to exclude persons from jury
service on the basis of race.7
During jury selection, each party is allowed a set number of
peremptory challenges or strikes.8 Traditionally, peremptory strikes may
be used to remove any potential juror for any reason and without any
explanation.9 However, the traditional underpinnings of the peremptory
strike contravened with the edicts of the Equal Protection Clause.10 As a

4. Id. at 2251.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1872).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1948).
8. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2238.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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result, the Supreme Court faced the issue of applying equal protection
principles to jury selection proceedings.11
In Strauder v. West Virginia,12 12 years after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
racial discrimination in the jury selection process. There, a state statute
permitted only Caucasians to serve as jurors, so the trial court summoned
an all Caucasian venire to try an African American male accused of
murder.13 In response, the defendant objected to the racial composition of
the venire, alleging denial of a right afforded to Caucasian males to be tried
before a jury consisting of the same race.14
The Supreme Court invalidated the state statute as unconstitutional,
explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment requires state’s laws to apply
equally to both African American and Caucasian individuals.15
Specifically, the Court concluded that all persons, either African American
or Caucasian, are equal before the laws of the states and discrimination on
the basis of race is impermissible.16 To that end, the Court held that a denial
of an African American to be tired before a jury consistent of his racial
peers was a denial of the equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.17
Echoing the decision in Strauder, the Court reiterated its holding in
subsequent cases that states may not discriminate on the basis of race in the
jury selection process.18 However, problems still persisted in guaranteeing
equal protection because although laws excluding African Americans from
jury service were unconstitutional after Strauder, many jurisdictions
employed discriminatory tools to prevent African Americans from serving
on a jury.19
One tool employed by many jurisdictions was the peremptory strike
allowing a prosecutor to strike individuals for any reason.20 Through the
exercise of the peremptory strike, racial exclusion became more concealed
and less evident with strikes exercised in individual courtrooms rather than
11. Id.
12. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
13. Id. at 304.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 307.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See e.g., Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1880); Carter v. Texas, 177
U.S. 442, 449 (1900); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613, 616 (1938); Pierre v. Louisiana,
306 U.S. 354, 362 (1939); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130-32 (1940); Avery v.
Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477-78 (1954);
Coleman v, Alabama, 377 U.S. 129, 133 (1964).
19. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2240.
20. Id.
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by comprehensive operation of law.21 While Strauder was a step toward
equality by allowing African Americans to participate in the democratic
process, jury selection remained entrenched with discriminatory intent
through the employment of peremptory challenges. Thus, 80 years after
Strauder, the Court revisited the subject of racial discrimination in jury
selection in Swain v. Alabama.22
The defendant was an African American male convicted of a capital
offense and sentenced to death.23 Prior to trial, the prosecutor struck all six
qualified African American potential jurors to ensure a panel of all
Caucasian jurors.24 Relying on the Strauder decision, the defendant argued
that the prosecutor impermissibly discriminated on the basis of race by
using peremptory challenges to strike all six African American potential
jurors.25
However, the Court held that the defendant failed to establish an
unconstitutional violation of discrimination based on the state’s exercise of
the six peremptory strikes.26 The Court explained that the striking of
African Americans in a particular case was not a denial of equal protection,
reasoning that prosecutors typically do not judge potential jurors
individually in exercising peremptory strikes.27 But rather, prosecutors
strike individual jurors based on limited knowledge afforded to them, which
include affiliations of the racial group.28 Otherwise stated, “a prosecutor
could permissibly strike an individual for any reason, including the
assumption or belief that a[n] [African American] prospective juror,
because of race, would be favorable to a[n] [African American] defendant
or unfavorable to the State.”29 In doing this, the Court focused on the nature
of the peremptory strike, allowing the strike to be exercised without inquiry
and without the court’s intrusion or control.30
Accordingly, under the Swain standard, for a defendant to
successfully challenge a prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory challenge,
he or she had to prove that the state consistently and systematically
discriminated on the basis of race in exercising its peremptory challenges.31
21. Id.
22. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
23. Id. at 203.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 209.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 220.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 223. The Court stated that “in case after case, whatever the
circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, had
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Upon proof of such pattern, the Court could infer that the state purposefully
excluded African Americans from the right to serve on a jury, which
constituted a denial of equal protection under law.32 However, this high
standard of demonstrating a state’s historical and systematic exclusion
posed an insurmountable burden on the defendant and essentially insulated
prosecutors’ peremptory strikes from constitutional review.33
In the seminal case of Batson v. Kentucky, 34 the Supreme Court
revisited the severe burden of proof imposed by Swain to remedy the high
bar for establishing a constitutional violation. At the time of the Batson
decision, African Americans continued their fight for fair and equal
treatment post-civil rights movement. Despite major legislative reform
such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964,35 the Voting Rights Act of 1964,36 and
the Fair Housing Act of 1968,37 racial discrimination still remained
interwoven in the nation’s social and economic fabric. The central focus of
the Batson decision was to emphasize the Fourteenth Amendment’s goal of
ending governmental discrimination on the basis of race.38 Consequently,
delivering the majority opinion, Justice Powell effectively overturned the
principles underlying the Swain decision and removed the obstacles for
establishing a constitutional violation.39
There, petitioner was an African American man indicted in
Kentucky for second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods.40 The
prosecution exercised all of its peremptory challenges to strike all four
African American potential jurors and, thus the jury consisted of only
Caucasian individuals.41 In response, defense counsel moved to discharge
the jury on the basis that the prosecution’s removal of the African American
veniremen violated the petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury
collected from a cross section of the community and Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection of the laws.42 Subsequently, the trial
judge permitted the parties to exercise their peremptory challenges to strike
anyone they wanted and denied petitioner’s motion, reasoning that the

been responsible for the removal for the removal of qualified [African American]
prospective jurors so that no [African American] jurors ever serve on petit juries.” Id.
32. Id. at 224.
33. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2241.
34. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
35. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (1964).
36. Id.
37. FAIR HOUSING ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 3602, et seq. (1964).
38. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2241.
39. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82.
40. Id. at 82.
41. Id. at 83.
42. Id.
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cross-section requirement applied only to the selection of venire and not to
the selection of petit jury itself.43
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, petitioner conceded
that Swain foreclosed an equal protection claim based solely on the
prosecutor’s conduct in his case but urged the court to follow the decisions
of other jurisdictions to find a violation of his rights under the Sixth
Amendment and the state constitution when the jury was not drawn from a
cross section of the community.44 Petitioner also argued that the
prosecution engaged in a “pattern” of discriminatory strikes in his case,
thus, establishing an equal protection violation under Swain.45 However, in
relying on Swain, the Kentucky Supreme Court disagreed with petitioner
and affirmed the lower court’s judgment, concluding that a defendant
alleging lack of fair cross section had to demonstrate systematic exclusion
of a group of jurors from the venire to establish a constitutional violation.46
Upon examination by the Supreme Court, Justice Powell
emphasized that the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was
elimination of governmental discrimination on the basis of race.47 Thus,
the high bar for establishing a constitutional violation through proof that
the state consistently and systematically employed discriminatory strikes
was a denial of equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.48 As a
result, the Batson decision effectively overruled Swain.49
Under the prevailing standard articulated by Batson, if a defendant
can demonstrate a prima facie case that the state’s peremptory strikes were
motivated by racial discrimination, the state is then required to provide
race-neutral reasons for its peremptory strikes.50 To assist courts in
adjudicating claims of racial discrimination in the exercise of a peremptory
strike, Batson established a three-step process.51 First, the defendant has
the burden of proving purposeful discrimination in the exercise of the
contested peremptory strike.52 For a defendant to establish a prima facie
case, he must first show that he is a member of a racial group susceptible to
differential treatment, and that the prosecution has exercised its peremptory
challenges to eliminate members of the defendant’s race from the venire.53
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 83-4.
46. Id. at 84.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 85.
49. Id. at 95.
50. Id. at 96-7.
51. Id. at 94.
52. Id. at 93.
53. Id. at 94.
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The defendant may also rely on the fact that the jury selection practice of a
peremptory strike permits “those to discriminate who are of a mind to
discriminate.”54 Lastly, the defendant may establish a prima facie case by
showing that the totality of relevant facts gives rise to an inference of
discriminatory purpose.55 All relevant circumstances may include evidence
of systematic exclusion of members of his race from jury service over an
extended period of time, as well as evidence of the prosecutor’s questions
and statements during voire dire.56 Importantly, the Court noted that the
examples are merely illustrative and placed confidence in the trial judge’s
to determine if circumstances creates a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination.57
Second, once the defendant has established a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination, the burden shifts to the State to offer a raceneutral explanation for the challenged strike.58 In overcoming its burden,
the prosecution’s explanation need not rise to the level of justifying a
challenge for cause.59 Yet, the prosecution cannot offer general assertions
that it had no discriminatory intent or that it challenged the jurors on the
assumption (or intuition) that they would be partial to the defendant because
of their shared race.60 But rather, the prosecution must articulate an
explanation related to the case being tried.61 Lastly, upon the prosecution’s
proffered race-neutral reason, the trial judge must determine whether the
state’s reasons were legitimate or were a mere pretext for racial
discrimination.62 Subsequent case law provides that a defendant may offer
a variety of evidence to support a claim of a discriminatory strike by the
prosecutor, including statistical evidence comparing strikes by the
prosecutor against potential African American and Caucasian jurors,
evidence of a prosecutor’s disparate questioning of potential jurors, sideby-side comparison of potential African American jurors who were struck
and potential Caucasian jurors who were not struck, a prosecutor’s
misrepresentation of the record when offering a race-neutral explanation,
relevant history of the state’s peremptory strikes in past cases, and other
relevant circumstances related to the issue of racial discrimination.63
54. Id. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
55. Id. at 96.
56. Id. at 96-7.
57. Id. at 97.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 98.
62. Id.
63. See Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016); Snyder v.
Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
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Applying this newly founded standard to the facts of the case, the
Court in Batson concluded that the petitioner made a timely objection to the
prosecutor’s removal of all African American potential jurors from the petit
jury.64 However, because the trial court rejected the objection without
requiring the prosecutor to offer a race-neutral explanation for the
peremptory strike, the Court remanded the case.65 Importantly, the Court
noted that if the trial court determined that the petitioner established a prima
facie of purposeful discrimination case based upon the facts and the
prosecutor failed to present a race-neutral explanation, the petitioner’s
conviction would have been reversed as consistent with the precedent
established by the Court.66
By enforcing the constitutional requirement that a criminal trial be
free of racial discrimination in the jury selection process, Batson sought to
eliminate the common practice of prosecutors excluding African American
jurors in cases involving defendants of the same race. 67 The decision
sought to protect the rights of defendants and jurors and ensure public
confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system. 68 In doing this,
the Court has reiterated and reinforced the decision in Batson in subsequent
cases and has extended the standard in various ways.69 For example, a
defendant of any race may raise a Batson challenge even if the defendant
and the juror are not of the same race.70 Further, Batson now applies to
gender discrimination and to both criminal and civil cases.71 Overall,
Batson sought to safeguard the constitutional guarantee of equal protection
in the criminal cases for both defendants and jurors, and thus, a criminal
defendant may challenge a state’s peremptory strike under the Equal
Protection Clause.72 Notably, though, many scholars and commentators
have highly criticized Batson for its failure to live up to its ideals, and many
studies have shown that racial discrimination still remains in jury
selection.73
64. Batson, 476 U.S. at 100.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2243.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see also Foster, 578 U.S. at ___; Snyder, 552 U.S. at 472; Miller-El,
545 U.S. at 231.
70. Id.; see also Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477-78 (1954).
71. Id.; see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994);
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614, 616 (1991).
72. Id.
73. See e.g. Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Racial Discrimination and
Jury Selection, 31 Crim. Just. 43 (2016); Ursula Noye, Blackstrikes: A Study of the
Racially Disparate Use of Peremptory Challenges by the Caddo Parish District
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B. Flowers v. Mississippi
1. Facts and Procedural History of Flowers v. Mississippi
Forty years later, in Flowers v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court
revisited the Fourteenth Amendment’s application to peremptory strikes
and the standard for determining a constitutional violation articulated by
Batson. The underlying events of the case occurred in Winona, Mississippi
in July 1996 where four victims were murdered at Tardy Furniture.74 At
the time of decision, petitioner, Curtis Flowers, was tried six separate times
for the murder of the four employees.75 The same prosecutor, Doug Evans,
represented the state of Mississippi in all six trials.76
In Flowers’ initial three trials, he was convicted of murder, but the
Mississippi Supreme Court reversed each conviction.77 At Flowers’ first
trial, the State exercised twelve peremptory strikes, five of which were used
to strike all potential African American jurors.78 The trial court rejected
Flowers’ Batson challenge and allowed the State to exercise all of its

Attorney’s Office, REPRIEVE AUSTRALIA (Aug. 2015), https://perma.cc/KE3Q-KQAX;
Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming
Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital Trials,
87 IOWA L. REV. 1531, 1534 (2012); Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A
Continuing Legacy, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Aug. 2010), https://eji.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf; Billy M.
Turner, Rickie D. Lovell, John C. Young & William F. Denny, Race and Peremptory
Challenges During Voir Dire: Do Prosecution and Defense Agree?, 14 J. CRIM. 61, 63
(1986); Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory Challenge Accused of Race or Gender
Discrimination? Some Data from One County, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 695 (1999);
Richard Bourke & Joe Hingston, Black Strikes: A Study of the Racially Disparate Use of
Peremptory Challenges by the Jefferson Parish District Attorney’s Office 5 (2003);
David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A
Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 53 (2001); Paul H. Schwartz,
Comment, Equal Protection in Jury Selection? The Implementation of Batson v. Kennedy
in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1533, 1577 (1991); Brian J. Serr & Mark Maney,
Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a
Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 65 (1988); Kenneth J. Melilli,
Batson in Practice: What we Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges,
71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 502-03 (1996); Daniel R. Pollitt & Brittany P. Warren,
Thirty Years of Disappointment: North Carolina’s Remarkable Appellate Batson Record,
94 N.C. L. REV. 1957, 1978 (2016); and Lorraine Morey, Keeping the Dragon Slayers in
Check: Reining in Prosecutorial Misconduct, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 617, 621-26 (2012).
74. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2234.
75. Id. at 2234.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2236.
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peremptory strikes.79 Subsequently, Flowers was convicted.80 The
Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the conviction due to prosecutorial
misconduct.81 In the second trial, the State again exercised its peremptory
strikes against all five potential African American jurors, but the trial court
found that the State’s reason for one of the strikes was based on a pretext
of discrimination.82 Because the trial court disallowed the strike, the court
sat the sole African American juror and Flowers was convicted.83
However, on appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the
conviction on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct.84 At the third trial, one
of the African American jurors was struck for cause, leaving only sixteen.85
Thereafter, the State exercised all of its fifteen peremptory strikes against
fifteen of the potential African American jurors.86 Again, the trial court
rejected Flowers’ Batson challenge and petitioner was convicted.87 Yet
again, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the conviction after finding
that the State had violated Batson by discriminating on the basis of race in
exercising all of its fifteen peremptory strikes.88 In reversing the
conviction, the court concluded that the case presented a strong prima facie
case of racial discrimination and that the State engaged in racially
discriminatory practice during the jury selection process.89
Flowers’ fourth and fifth trial ended in mistrials.90 In the fourth
trial, the State used eleven out of eleven peremptory strikes against potential
African American jurors.91 However, the jury was unable to reach a
verdict.92 At Flowers’ fifth trial, there is no information available regarding
the race of prospective jurors.93 At Flowers’ sixth trial, which the United
States Supreme Court considered upon review of this instant case, there
were twenty-six prospective jurors, six African American and twenty
Caucasian.94 There, the State exercised six peremptory strikes, using five

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing Flowers v. State, 773 So. 2d 309, 317 (Miss. 2000)).
82. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2236.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2237 (citing Flowers v. State, 842 So. 2d 531, 538 (Miss. 2003)).
85. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2237.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing Flowers v. State, 947 So. 2d 910, 939 (Miss. 2007)).
89. Id.
90. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2237.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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against African American prospective jurors.95 This left one African
American juror to sit on the jury.96 Again, the trial court rejected Flowers’
Batson challenge, finding that the State presented race-neutral explanations
for each of the five peremptory strikes exercised against the five African
American jurors.97 Thus, the seated jury consisted of eleven Caucasian
jurors and one African American juror.98 Ultimately, the jury convicted
Flowers of murder and sentenced him to death.99
Upon review, the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with the trial
court’s decision regarding the Batson issue, concluding that the State’s
proffered race-neutral reasons were valid and not merely pretextual.100
Thereafter, Flowers sought review from the United States Supreme Court,
in which the Court granted this writ of certiorari, remanding the proceeding
for further consideration in view of the decision in Foster v. Chatman.101
On remand, the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld Flowers’ conviction in
a 5-to-4 vote.102 Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the matter.103
2. Majority Opinion Delivered by Justice Kavanaugh
Recently appointed Supreme Court Justice, Brett Kavanaugh,
delivered the majority opinion of Flowers v. Mississippi. Remarkably,
Justice Kavanaugh analyzed the landmark case of Batson v. Kentucky 104 in
his law review note while attending Yale Law School in 1989. 105
The sole issue upon review was whether the Mississippi trial court
clearly erred in concluding that the State was not motivated in substantial
part by discriminatory intent when exercising its peremptory strikes at
Flowers’ sixth trial.106 Justice Kavanaugh began his opinion with a
historical overview of Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition of racial
discrimination in jury selection and the relevant case law leading up to the

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. (citing Flowers v. State, 158 So. 3d 1009, 1058 (Miss. 2014)).
101. 578 U.S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 195 L.E. 2d 1 (2016).
102. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2238 (citing Flowers v. State, 240 So. 3d 1082
(Miss. 2017)).
103. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2238.
104. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
105. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Defense Presence and Participation: A Procedural
Minimum for Batson v. Kentucky Hearings, 99 YALE L.J. 187 (1989).
106. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2244.
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Batson decision.107 Next, Justice Kavanaugh underscored three evidentiary
and procedural issues raised by the Batson holding.108
Throughout his discussion of Batson, Justice Kavanaugh revered the
decision as immediately revolutionizing jury selection designed to eradicate
racial discrimination.109 According to Justice Kavanaugh, Batson ended the
widespread practice in which prosecutors routinely struck all African
American potential jurors from cases involving defendants of the same
race.110
Turning next to the application of the case, Justice Kavanaugh
addressed the extraordinary facts of Flowers’ case against the contextual
framework established by Batson.111 In doing so, the majority assessed four
evidentiary considerations of the instant case:
(1) the history from Flowers’ six trials, (2)
the prosecutor’s striking of five and six
[African American] prospective jurors at the
sixth trial, (3) the prosecutor’s dramatically
disparate questioning of [African American]
and [Caucasian] prospective jurors at the
sixth trial, and (4) the prosecutor’s proffered
reasons for striking [African American] juror
(Carolyn White) while allowing other
similarly situated [Caucasian] jurors to serve
on the jury at the sixth trial.112
The first evidentiary consideration the majority addressed was the
history from Flowers’ six trials.113 Justice Kavanaugh reiterated that a trial
judge may consider the historical evidence of the State’s discriminatory
peremptory strikes from prior trials in the jurisdiction to support a claim of
racial discrimination.114 Thus, a defendant bringing a Batson claim may

107. Id. at 2238-41.
108. Id. at 2243.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2244.
112. Id. Importantly, the majority noted that it only had to give great deference
to the Mississippi trial court’s decision rather than the Mississippi Supreme Court’s
findings because the case arose on direct review. Id.
113. Id. at 2245.
114. Id. Under the previous standard, the only way a defendant could make a
claim that the State discriminated on the basis of race in the exercise of peremptory
strikes was for the defendant to establish a historical pattern of racial exclusion of jurors.
Swain, 380 U.S. at 223.

2021]

DEFLOWERING FLOWERS V. MISSISSIPPI

339

gather and rely on all relevant evidence and circumstances to support his or
her challenge.115
Justice Kavanaugh began his review of the history with an overview
of the numbers from Flowers’ first four trials, noting that the State tried to
strike thirty-six prospective African American jurors.116 This evidenced a
pattern of excluding African American prospective jurors by the State,
which, under Batson, may give rise to an inference of racial
discrimination.117 Moreover, the majority noted that the Mississippi
Supreme Court found on two occasions that the State impermissibly
excluded African American prospective jurors in violation of Batson.118
In addition to an overall review of the numbers demonstrating the
State’s pattern of striking only African American jurors, Justice Kavanaugh
summarized the most relevant history of Flowers’ trials beginning from
petitioner’s first trial.119 Based on the historical overview of Flowers’ first
four trials, the majority concluded that the State exercised its peremptory
strikes to eliminate as many African American prospective jurors as
possible.120 This systematic elimination suggested that the State sought to
empanel an all Caucasian jury.121 Accordingly, the majority’s review of
the history of Flowers’ first four trials strongly supported its conclusion that
the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory strikes at Flowers’ sixth trial was
substantially motivated in part by discriminatory intent.122
The second evidentiary consideration the majority addressed was
the prosecutor’s striking of five of the six African American prospective
jurors at petitioner’s sixth trial.123 Again, a pattern of striking members of
a particular race may give rise to an inference of racial discrimination.124
During Flowers’ sixth trial, there were twenty-six prospective jurors
with six who were African American.125 The State accepted one African
115. Id. at 2245 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. For example, in Flowers’ second trial, the court found that the State
discriminated against one African American juror evinced by the State’s false proffered
reason that the stricken juror was inattentive and nodding off during questioning, and
therefore the court sustained Flowers’ Batson challenge. Also, at Flowers’ third trial, the
Mississippi Supreme Court held that the case presented a strong prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination on the basis of the State exercising all 15 peremptory strikes to
eliminate all 15 African American jurors. Id.
119. Id. at 2246.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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American juror; however, it peremptorily struck the remaining five African
American jurors.126 Thus, the seated jury at the sixth trial consisted of
eleven Caucasian jurors and one African American juror.127
According to Justice Kavanaugh, the State’s exercise of
peremptory strikes in petitioner’s sixth trial was similar to the first four
trials.128 While the majority did acknowledge that the State in the sixth trial
accepted one African American juror, such acceptance did not insulate the
State from a Batson challenge given the history of the instant case.129
Bolstering this observation, Justice Kavanaugh relied upon the finding in
Miller-El v. Dretke130 that a State may accept one African American juror
to obscure a pattern of consistently opposing African American jurors from
being seated.131 Therefore, the majority concluded that the State
peremptorily striking five of the six prospective African American jurors at
the sixth trial supported the conclusion that the State was motivated in
substantial party by discriminatory intent.132
Turning next to the third evidentiary consideration, Justice
Kavanaugh addressed the disparate questioning of the African American
and Caucasian prospective jurors during Flowers’ sixth trial.133 According
to Batson, a prosecutor’s questions and statements during the jury selection
process may support or rebut an inference of discriminatory intent.134
At Flowers’ sixth trial, the majority noted that the State asked the
five struck African American jurors a total of 145 questions, in contrast to
the total of 12 questions it asked to the 11 seated Caucasian jurors.135
Statistically speaking, the State asked twenty-nine questions to each
African American juror as opposed to one question it asked to each
Caucasian juror.136 As the majority noted, this comparison of questions
asked by the State necessarily inferred the finding that the State spent more
time questioning the prospective African American jurors than the accepted
Caucasian jurors.137
In response to the evidence of disparate questioning, which is
probative of discriminatory intent, the State argued that it questioned the
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2247.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 545 U.S. 231, 250 (2005).
131. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2247.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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prospective African American and Caucasian jurors differently because of
differences in the jurors’ characteristics.138 However, the Court rejected the
argument, finding that the record reflected otherwise.139 While it is
reasonable for the State to ask follow-up questions or to investigate
relationships between the jurors and witnesses, the record reflected that the
State did not question the prospective Caucasian jurors as extensively or
investigated as thoroughly than the struck African American jurors, even
though the jurors had substantial ties to the petitioner and the petitioner’s
family.140 Importantly, although disparate questioning or investigation
alone is not determinative of a Batson violation, such questioning, along
with other evidence, may support an inference racial discrimination.141
Consequently, the majority concluded that the dramatically disparate
questioning of African American and Caucasian jurors at the petitioner’s
sixth trial coupled with the historical evidence from the first four trials,
supported its conclusion that the State was motivated in substantial part by
a discriminatory intent at Flowers’ sixth trial.142
Finally, the majority reviewed the fourth evidentiary consideration
of the facts and circumstances surrounding the State’s peremptory strike of
prospective African American juror, Carolyn Wright, at Flowers’ sixth
trial.143
As the majority recognized, comparing struck jurors and accepted
jurors is a useful strategy in determining whether a Batson violation has
occurred.144 Such comparison can insinuate that the State’s given reason
for striking a juror was a pretext for discrimination.145 It is important to
consider, though, that a defendant is not required to identify an identical
Caucasian juror for the comparison to imply a discriminatory intent.146
According to Miller-El v. Dretke,147 case law does not require that the
individuals compared be identical in all respects because a rule providing
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2248. For example, Dianne Copper, an African American
prospective juror, was asked 18 follow-up questions about her relationship with the
Flowers’ and his family. In contrast, Pamela Chesteen, a Caucasian juror, was not asked
nay follow-up questions notwithstanding the fact that Chesteen knew several members of
Flowers’ family. Similarly, the State asked no follow-up questions of the other four
Caucasian prospective jurors, even though they had relationships with the defense’s
witnesses. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2249.
144. Id. at 2250.; see also Snyder, 552 U.S. at 483-84.
145. Id.; see also Foster, 578 U.S. at ___.
146. Id.; see also Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 247.
147. 545 U.S. 231, 247, n. 6 (2005).
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that a “defendant cannot win a Batson claim unless there is an exactly
identical [Caucasian] juror would leave Batson inoperable.”148
The majority noted that while Wright was a proponent for the death
penalty and had a family member that was a prison guard, the State’s
proffered reason for the contested strike was due to her relationship with
several defense witnesses and her employment at the Wal-Mart where
Flowers’ father also worked.149 Yet, Justice Kavanaugh identified three
other prospective Caucasian jurors was also knew many individuals
involved in the case;150 nonetheless, the jurors were not asked individual
follow-up questions, unlike Wright.151 Moreover, even though the record
reflected that Wright had worked at the local Wal-Mart with Flowers’
father, there was no evidence that they worked closely together or even
knew each other.152 This side-by-side comparison of the struck African
American to the similarly situated Caucasian jurors suggested a
discriminatory intent by the State.153
In addition, the State also explained that it struck Wright for her
prior litigation with Tardy Furniture thirteen years earlier.154 However, the
majority rejected this reason, explaining that the State failed to explain how
Wright’s prior lawsuit would affect her ability to impartially serve as a juror
at the sixth trial.155 Further, the State also explained that it struck Wright
because she worked with one of Flowers’ sisters.156 However, again, the
majority rejected this explanation, finding that the State made an incorrect
statement about the record, which is indicative of discriminatory intent.157
Justice Kavanaugh identified three other occasions where the State
misstated the record to justify the striking of African American prospective
jurors.158
148. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2249.
149. Id.
150. Id. Chesteen, a Caucasian juror, had provided services to the Flowers
family at the local bank and knew several of the Flowers’ family members. Similarly,
Bobby Lester, another Caucasian juror, also worked at the bank and knew several family
members of the defendant.
151. Id. at 2250.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. The majority noted that the State made incorrect statements in regard to
three prospective African American jurors Tashia Cunningham, Edith Burnside, and
Flancie Jones. The State asserted that Cunningham and Flowers’ sister were close
friends; however, the parties only had a working relationship. Likewise, the State
claimed that Burnside had tried to hide a lawsuit involving Tardy Furniture, but she had
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In noting that the side-by-side comparison of Wright to accepted
Caucasian jurors should not be considered in isolation, the majority
examined the strike in the context of all the facts and circumstances as
consistent with prior precedent.159 In light of the history of the State’s
exercise of peremptory strikes, the State’s striking of five of the six African
American prospective jurors at Flowers’ sixth trial, and the State’s
dramatically disparate questioning of jurors during the sixth trial suggested
that the State was motivated in part by discriminatory intent.160
Overall, Justice Kavanaugh reversed and remanded the case on the
basis that all the facts and circumstances of the four factors considered as a
whole established that the trial court at Flowers’ sixth trial committed clear
error in concluding that the State’s peremptory strike of Wright was not
motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.161 Notably, Justice
Kavanaugh stated that the Court need not decide that any one of the four
factors alone would require reversal, and emphasized that the decision
broke no new legal ground.162
3. Concurring Opinion by Justice Alito
Justice Alito delivered a brief concurring opinion. In his
concurrence, Justice Alito explained that there would have been little
difficulty in affirming Flowers’ conviction given the State’s facially
legitimate reasons for its peremptory strikes.163 However, because of the
many connections a high percentage of the potential jurors had to either
Flowers or the victims and the fact that the case was tried by the same
prosecutor in all six trials, the jury selection process was not able to be
assessed as it would have been in a typical proceeding. 164 These
connections, as Justice Alito acknowledged, complicated the trial judge’s
ability to determine whether the prosecutor’s proffered reasons was mere
pretext of racial discrimination or legitimate intentions.165 Accordingly,
Justice Alito, in viewing the totality of the circumstances, concurred with
the Court’s reversal of Flowers’ conviction and remand of the case for
further proceedings.166
not. And, lastly, the State alleged that Jones was Flowers’ aunt; however, that was
untrue. Id.
159. Id. at 2251.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2252.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.

344

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 39:2

4. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas delivered the dissenting opinion of Flowers v.
Mississippi with whom Justice Gorsuch joined Parts I, II, and III of the
opinion.167 In his contemptuous opinion, Justice Thomas began his lengthy
dissent by admonishing the Court for incorrectly granting review of the
case.168 He chided the majority for reframing the issue of the case, so it
could review the factual findings of the state courts without resolving the
actual legal question.169 Justice Thomas further speculated that the Court
granted certiorari because of the media attention surrounding the case.170
Consequently, Justice Thomas contended that the grant of review wasted
the State’s, defendant’s, and lower court’s resources by not reviewing the
state court’s application of Batson the first time.171
The second part of the dissent’s argument focused on the merits of
the case, concluding that no evidence presented purposeful race
discrimination by the State in jury selection at Flowers’ sixth trial.172
Specifically, Justice Thomas argued that each of the five strikes at the sixth
trial were justified by the State’s proffered race-neutral grounds, that none
of the struck African American jurors were remotely similar to the seated
Caucasian jurors, and that the trivial mistakes of fact or disparate
questioning on part of the State provided no evidence of purposeful racial
discrimination.173
Because there was no evidence of racial discrimination, the dissent
contended, in part three, that the majority’s decision hinged only upon
conduct that occurred before the instant case.174 Particularly, Justice
Kavanaugh’s reliance upon the narrative that the instant case had a long
history of racial discrimination to support its finding of a clear error on part
of the trial court was improper and had no basis in the record.175 According
to Justice Thomas, Flowers’ was unable to overcome his burden of
establishing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, and thus, the
trial court did not clearly err in its holding.176
In the finale of Justice Thomas’ laborious dissent, with whom
Justice Gorsuch declined to join, part four focused on the constitutional
167. Id. at 2253.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2254.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2255.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2267.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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implications of Batson.177 According to Justice Thomas, Batson has led the
Court to disregard the limitations set forth by Article III on standing by
allowing a convicted criminal, who has suffered no injury, additional
opportunities.178 In the present case, the dissent noted that Flowers suffered
no legally cognizable harm because he was not the juror excluded on the
basis of race.179 Flowers also failed to assert his right to an impartial jury.180
Therefore, although the majority held that Wright’s denial from jury service
was a denial of equal protection, she was not the individual challenging
Flowers’ convictions, and, thereby Flowers’ lacked standing to assert her
claim.181
Additionally, Justice Thomas vehemently opposed Batson itself.182
Unlike Justice Kavanaugh who famed Batson as revolutionizing the jury
selection process,183 Justice Thomas contended that the decision imposed
equal protection principles upon a procedure designed to give parties
absolute discretion in exercising their peremptory strikes.184 Since the
decades following Batson, the dissent characterized the cases as a
“misguided effort to remedy societal wrong by using the Constitution to
regulate the traditionally discretionary exercise of peremptory
challenges.185 Batson “emphasiz[es] the rights of excluded jurors at the
expense of the traditional protection according criminal defendants of all
races,”186 rather than to help ensure fairness of criminal proceedings.187
Therefore, Justice Thomas urged the Court to return to the days before
Batson where race mattered in a courtroom to allow litigants utilization of
an important tool to prevent prejudice in their case.188
177. Id. at 2270.
178. Id.
179. Id.; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 89; see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400, 414 (1991); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)
(explaining that to have standing to bring an equal protection claim in a separate suit,
“the juror would have to show that the State’s action caused him to suffer an injury in
fact, and a likelihood that a favorable decision will redress the injury.”)
180. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
181. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2270. While a defendant could conceivably suffer an
injury under a Batson violation if the court believes that he would receive a more
favorable outcome if more members of his race are on the jury, this opportunity
contravenes with the rejected assumption that jurors might be partial to the defendant
because of their shared race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
182. Id. at 2271.
183. Id. at 2243.
184. Id. at 2271.
185. Id. (quoting Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 404 n.1 (1998)
(THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
186. Id.
187. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2243.
188. Id.
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In support of his argument that the Court should abandon the Batson
framework, Justice Thomas reviewed the evolving jurisprudence of the
peremptory strike.189 Batson’s reliance on equal protection ignored the
nature of the peremptory strike and the realities of racial prejudice.190
Because “the [peremptory] strike is exercised based on intuition that a
potential juror may be less sympathetic to a party’s case,” a strike “reflect[s]
no judgment on a juror’s competence, ability or fitness.”191 Thus, a juror is
challenged on the basis of the limited knowledge afforded to counsel, which
may include the juror’s group affiliations.192
Moreover, Justice Thomas criticized Batson for focusing solely on
individual rights of jurors instead of the traditional underpinnings of the
peremptory challenge.193 Historically, the peremptory strike protected
against impartiality and effectuated a party’s intuitions about a juror’s
unstated biases.194 By requiring an explanation for the strike, as demanded
by equal protection guarantee, the requirement contravenes with the very
nature of the practice.195 The strike must be exercised with full freedom or
its purpose fails.196 Also, the dissent argued that the application of an equal
protection analysis to the peremptory strike has distorted the nation’s
jurisprudence since the Court did not apply equal protection ideologies to
peremptory strikes until more than 100 years after the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified.197 Thus, in closing, Justice Thomas opposed
Batson for leading the way to eliminate peremptory strikes by requiring an
explanation for individual strikes as inconsistent with the practice’s
underlying rationale.198
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Batson: An Ineffective Tool
The overall objective of Batson and its progeny was to instill public
respect and to ensure confidence in the criminal justice system to safeguard
189. Id. at 2272-73.
190. Id. at 2273.
191. Id.
192. Id.; see Swain, 380 U.S. at 221.
193. Id. at 2273.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2274; see Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892).
197. Id. at 2274.
198. Id. Justice Thomas explained that the realities of racial biases, sympathies,
and prejudices are part of the racial composition of a jury that should not be rendered
obsolete. Such thinking would prevent African American defendants from striking
potentially hostile Caucasian jurors, and thus, hindering a fair trial.

2021]

DEFLOWERING FLOWERS V. MISSISSIPPI

347

the fundamental right that no citizens shall be disqualified from jury service
on the basis of race.199 Yet, evidence suggests that Batson is not the
effective mechanism the Supreme Court hoped it to be.
Throughout Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion of Flowers v.
Mississippi, he praised the Batson decision for revolutionizing the jury
selection process by providing a mechanism to eliminate discrimination,
and for immediately eliminating the widespread practice of prosecutors
routinely striking African American jurors in cases involving defendants of
the same race.200 In sharp contrast, Justice Thomas in his dissent repeatedly
criticized Batson as a misguided effort to remedy a societal wrong by
imposing constitutional limitations on a “traditionally discretionary
exercise of peremptory challenges.”201 In other words, the majority
overstated the effectiveness of Batson, while the dissent disagreed with the
method of such reform to ensure equal protection rights.
1. Studies of racial discrimination in jury selection
Evidence suggests that substantial disparities still remain.202 Batson
has failed to enforce the mandate of equal protection and administration of
justice, nor has it ensured the community’s interest in a fair and impartial
criminal justice system. For example, in a recent study, the Caddo Parish
District Attorney’s office in Louisiana collected data from 332 felony jury
trials from 2003 to 2012. 203 By examining the rate at which prosecutors
exercised their peremptory strikes against the race of the stricken or
accepted jurors, the data revealed that when presented with a prospective
African American juror, prosecutors peremptorily struck that African
American juror 46% of the time.204 In contrast, when presented with a
Caucasian juror, the prosecutors struck that juror only 15% of the time.205
Consequently, based on the data, prosecutors were more than three times as
likely to strike African American prospective jurors than others.206
Similarly, law students from the University of Iowa studied the
exercise of peremptory strikes by prosecutors in capital trials of defendants
199. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986).
200. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2241.
201. Id. at 2270.
202. Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Racial Discrimination and Jury
Selection, 31 CRIM. JUST. 43 (2016).
203. Ursula Noye, Blackstrikes: A Study of the Racially Disparate Use of
Peremptory Challenges by the Caddo Parish District Attorney’s Office, REPRIEVE
AUSTRALIA (Aug. 2015), https://perma.cc/KE3Q-KQAX.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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on death row in North Carolina as of 2010.207 Over a twenty-year period,
the data revealed that prosecutors struck prospective African American
jurors at about 2.5 times the rate that they struck prospective jurors of a
different race.208 The article also examined studies analyzing appellate
decisions reviewing Batson claims, and concluded that Batson has been
unsuccessful in expelling race from the jury selection process.209
Moreover, a 2010 report conducted by the Equal Justice Initiative
focused on jury selection procedures in eight southern states, including
Mississippi, finding evidence of racial discrimination in jury selection in
every state.210 The report uncovered that prosecutors excluded nearly 80%
of African Americans qualified for jury service.211 Of the counties
composed of a majority of African American residents, capital defendants
were tried by all Caucasian juries.212 Further, the report noted that
challenges for underrepresentation in the jury pool is impossible in more
than 90% of counties for Latinos and Asian Americans.213 Further studies
have revealed the same.214 Overall, evidence indicates substantial
disparities in race in jury selection, thus suggesting that racial
discrimination remains deeply entrenched in jury selection.
207. Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The
Overwhelming Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina
Capital Trials, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1531, 1534 (2012).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1541.
210. Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A Continuing Legacy,
EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Aug. 2010), at 4, https://eji.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 36.
214. See e.g. Billy M. Turner, Rickie D. Lovell, John C. Young & William F.
Denny, Race and Peremptory Challenges During Voir Dire: Do Prosecution and
Defense Agree?, 14 J. CRIM. 61, 63 (1986) (finding that 44% of prospective African
American jurors were struck, even though the percentage of the population in the
Louisiana parish that were African American was 18%); Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory
Challenge Accused of Race or Gender Discrimination? Some Data from One County, 23
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 695 (1999) (finding that prosecutors used 60% of their strikes
against African American jurors, who constituted 32% of the venire, while defense
attorneys used 87% of their strikes against Caucasian jurors, who constituted 68% of the
venire); Richard Bourke & Joe Hingston, Black Strikes: A Study of the Racially
Disparate Use of Peremptory Challenges by the Jefferson Parish District Attorney’s
Office 5 (2003) (finding that in juries consisting of six or twelve jurors, prosecutors
struck prospective African American jurors at more than three times the rate they struck
Caucasian jurors); David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital
Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 53 (2001)
(finding that prosecutors struck on average 51% of African Americans jurors compared
to only 26% of jurors of a different race).

2021]

DEFLOWERING FLOWERS V. MISSISSIPPI

349

2. Reasons for Batson’s ineffectiveness
One possible reason for Batson’s ineffectiveness at expelling racial
discrimination is that the decision failed to address that a peremptory strike
may be still be exercised irrationally and illegitimately, so long as the basis
for the strike was not race. In other words, under Batson, as long as the
reason for the strike is found to be race-neutral, the prosecution may
continue to strike prospective jurors for any reason. For example, in the
same report conducted by the Equal Justice Initiative in 2010, the results
revealed that in many of the cases reviewed, the race neutral explanations
for exclusion were based on pretextual reasons intended to conceal racial
biases, including exclusion based on low intelligence, wore eyeglasses,
were single, married, or separated, or were too old for jury service.215 The
African American prospective jurors were also excluded for having
relatives who attended historically African American colleges, for the way
they walk, for chewing gum, and for frequently living in predominately
African American neighborhoods.216 Thus, as long as the proffered reason
is race neutral, the trial court may accept the reason as permissible, even
though the strike was based on illegitimate explanations.
Another possible reason for Batson’s ineffectiveness is the trial
courts’ reluctance to find a Batson violation and the appellate courts
deferential standard in reviewing Batson challenges. A prosecutor need
only offer a race neutral explanation to overcome the second hurdle of a
Batson analysis. Typically, this burden is easy to overcome because trial
courts accept the reason as permissible instead extending the inquiry to
assess the credibility of the prosecutor.217 Moreover, appellate courts
employ a deferential standard of review for Batson challenges because
appellate courts only review the record, while trial courts are able to view
the demeanor of the jurors and attorneys in the court room.218 As Justice
Kavanaugh noted in his opinion of Flowers, appellate standard of review
of a trial court’s factual findings is highly deferential.219
Lastly, another possible reason for Batson’s ineffectiveness is the
ease in which prosecutors can meet their burden to offer a race-neutral
explanation for the challenged strike.
As previously stated, the burden of establishing a race neutral explanation
is not difficult. The prosecutors’ race-neutral reason need not be persuasive
215. Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A Continuing Legacy,
EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Aug. 2010), at 36, https://eji.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf.
216. Id. at 4.
217. Nancy C. Marder, Batson Revisited, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1585, 1593 (2012).
218. Id.; see Schwartz, supra note 73, at 1568-71.
219. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2244.
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or plausible.220 A prosecutor’s race neutral reasons to rebut an inference of
discrimination falls within two categories: Objectively verifiable reasons
that lead to challenges for cause based on bias or other grounds, and
primarily subjective reasons which lead to challenges based on inarticulable
gut feelings.221 Valid explanations that fall within the first category include
a juror who has a close relative to the defendant, a juror who was previously
represented by defense counsel, a juror about the same age as defendant, a
juror who had past legal problems with the government, and a juror who
was young, single, unemployed, or poor.222 Valid reasons falling within
the second category include a juror with a poor attitude, a juror who
appeared disinterested, unintelligent, or bewildered, a juror who seemed
hostile to the prosecutor, a juror who was unable to get along with other
jurors, and a juror who was anti-law enforcement from previous
experiences.223 Based on these valid explanations, prosecutors are able to
disguise their racial discrimination with race neutral explanations to
overcome their burden.
One study reviewed cases from 1986 through 1993 to examine the
success rate of prosecutors in offering a race neutral explanation.224 The
results suggested that while it was relatively easy for a defendant to
establish a prima facie case, it was difficult to prevail on a Batson challenge
overall.225 A possible reason for this was the ease in which the responding
party was able to offer a neutral explanation.226 Further results uncovered
that criminal defense attorneys were disproportionately unsuccessful at
offering neutral explanations, while in contrast, prosecutors enjoyed a
higher success rate at rebutting prima facie cases with neutral
explanations.227 The study further examined the success rate of providing
neutral explanations by targeted groups.228 The overall results indicated
that Batson respondents offered valid neutral explanations in almost four
out of five situations.229 Notably, the results indicated that in cases of
reverse Batson challenges against Caucasian jurors, prosecutors had more

220. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 267.
221. Serr & Mark, supra note 73, at 44-47.
222. Id. at 44-46. (explaining also that a juror who was subscribed to a black
newspaper which was pro-defendant in its coverage was a valid reason for a challenge).
223. Id. at 46-47.
224. Melilli, supra note 73, at 460.
225. Id. at 460-61.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 461.
228. Id. at 462-65.
229. Id. at 465.
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success than defense attorneys challenging prosecutors’ strikes.230 Thus,
even if a defendant establishes a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination at the first step, the burden imposed on the prosecutor to
present a race-neutral explanation for the strike is easy to overcome, and it
remains difficult to prevail on a Batson challenge.231
3. Solutions for Batson
The Batson decision was the focal point surrounding the majority’s
ruling in Flowers v. Mississippi where, upon review, the sole question was
whether the Mississippi Supreme Court’s ruling concerning the State’s past
use of peremptory strikes in Flowers’ case was proper within the scope of
the Batson challenge. However, because evidence suggests that racial
discrimination still remains entrenched in the jury selection process, this
provokes the question of whether Batson is the proper standard to determine
if racial discrimination did indeed exist at the time of the exercise of a
peremptory challenge. As many scholars have regarded Batson as a failure
for its inability to eliminate discriminatory use of the peremptory strike, this
suggests that the Mississippi Supreme Court was improperly guided as to
its conclusion that no Batson violation had occurred, and thus, review by
the Supreme Court was unnecessary if the standard had been appropriate.
Based on the standard under Batson, once the defendant meets his
or her burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the
burden shifts to the prosecution to offer a race neutral explanation for the
challenged strike. As scholars and studies have uncovered, this is an
exceptionally low burden to overcome because a prosecutor’s reason need
not be plausible or persuasive, so long as the prosecutor does not rebut the
defendant’s prima facie case by stating merely that he challenged the juror
on the assumption that the juror would be partial to the defendant because
of their shared race or by merely denying that he had a discriminatory
motive or by affirming his good faith belief in the individual selection.232
This allows prosecutors to exclude African American jurors for any reason
by providing a list of explanations for striking a particular juror that are
essentially a substitute for exclusion on the basis of race.
To ensure that racial discrimination does not infiltrate the jury
selection process, a more stringent standard should be established to
safeguard against racial discrimination. For example, a higher burden of
230. Id. at 462-65 (explaining that Batson respondents were less successful in
providing valid explanations for challenges based on gender or against Caucasian jurors,
as compared to challenges against African Americans or Hispanics).
231. Id. at 462.
232. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986).
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proof should be required for a prosecutor to overcome the burden of
offering a race neutral explanation. Even though the Batson court stated
that the race neutral explanation need not rise to the level justifying a
challenge for cause,233 a similarly high standard should be employed for
evaluating a prosecutor’s race neutral reason. As studies have shown, the
prosecution may easily overcome their burden at the second step because
of the thinly veiled justifications accepted by the court, even though the
reasons are actually exercised based on discriminatory intent. If a higher
burden of proof is required, then this may reduce the likelihood that the
prosecution is able to eliminate potential African American jurors on the
basis of discrimination because the prosecution may not rest on its laurels
and will be required to offer an actual valid reason for the strike.
Moreover, Justice Thomas noted in his dissent of the instant case
that race based peremptory strikes are not reviewed under the strict scrutiny
standard.234 As the Supreme Court has consistently held, laws that infringe
upon a fundamental right or involve a race-based classification are subject
to the strict scrutiny standard pursuant to the Court’s equal protection and
due process jurisprudence.235 Yet, even though a Batson challenge is based
on an argument of racial discrimination, it remains the glaring exception to
the strict scrutiny standard. The current standard only requires a barely
plausible explanation for the proffered race-neutral explanation. This begs
the question of why a Batson challenge is exempted from the strict scrutiny
review while the Court has historically applied the highest standard for laws
that infringe upon a fundamental right or involves a suspect classification,
such as race. If the Court were to apply a strict scrutiny standard in
reviewing the constitutionality of the government’s discrimination, as it
does for other race-based classifications, this may reduce the likelihood of
discrimination in jury selection because the government’s proffered raceneutral explanation would have to pass high constitutional muster.
Accordingly, the core of equal justice demands a higher standard for both
reviewing a race-based peremptory challenge and overcoming the burden
of offering a race-neutral explanation to ensure that discrimination does
persist and that the Equal Protection Clause does not become illusory and
futile.
In addition to a higher burden of proof at the second step and
applying the strict scrutiny standard for reviewing race-based peremptory
challenge, a trial court should diligently and strictly analyze a prosecutor’s
exercise of a peremptory challenge when there is a history of racial
233. Id.
234. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2271.
235. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).

2021]

DEFLOWERING FLOWERS V. MISSISSIPPI

353

discrimination or even a hint of it. As the majority stated in Batson, “one
racially discriminatory peremptory strike is one too many,” and as Chief
Justice Roberts mentioned at oral argument of the instant case, a
prosecutor’s Batson violation is pertinent to the assessment of a current
Batson challenge.236 If the prosecution cannot offer a valid race-neutral
explanation coupled with a history of racial discrimination, a prosecutor
should not have the privilege of utilizing peremptory challenges to his or
her advantage. This may deter the misconduct if peremptory strikes are not
made available because a prosecutor may be more careful in striking
potential jurors. Just as criminal defendants are incarcerated or fined if
found guilty, prosecutors should be penalized for their misconduct.
Lastly, a solution to the ineffectiveness of Batson may be to film the
hearings so appellate courts are able to watch the jury selection and see
what the trial judge views. According to prior studies, appellate courts are
highly deferential to a trial court’s findings because the trial court is able to
gauge the demeanor and mannerisms of the prospective jurors. A recording
of the Batson hearing may eliminate the need for the highly deferential
standard of review because appellate courts are able to view the factual
findings presented at trial and may not rely solely on the findings of trial
courts. Moreover, the benefits to filming the hearings would outweigh the
administrative burdens, if any, because filming may be operated by the
court personnel in the ordinary course of the court’s business and allow
reviewing courts complete visualization of the proceedings. Filming the
proceedings may also provide efficiency and modernization to the
courtroom because it can be used to record jury selection so that an
immediate record is available for use in preparation of appeal and review
by the appellate court.237 Accordingly, by filming Batson hearings, an
appellate court may have the privilege of viewing the proceedings for itself
and not have to rely wholly on findings of the trial courts in determining
whether a prosecutor discriminated in striking a potential juror.
B. Legitimizing an Ineffective Tool
Flowers v. Mississippi represents the Supreme Court’s recent
application of the Fourteenth Amendment to a criminal procedure issue.
Throughout the majority opinion, Justice Kavanaugh repeatedly stressed
that equal justice requires that a criminal trial be free from racial
discrimination in jury selection and that discriminatory jury selection
236. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18:22-25, 19:1, Flowers v. Mississippi, 139
S. Ct. 2228 (2019) (No. 17-9572).
237. Guy O. Kornblum, Videotape in Civil Cases, 24 HASTINGS L. J. 9, 10
(1972).
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violates the Fourteenth Amendment.238 Yet, the majority opinion failed to
further or strengthen Batson.
To answer the sole question on review, the Court analyzed four
evidentiary categories it deemed relevant.239 However, the majority limited
its application to these four factors, which focused only on the pattern of
racial discrimination by the State in Flowers’ particular case. Although the
Batson court discussed that a court may consider the long and unexplained
exclusion of members from the defendant’s particular race in other jury
panels,240 the majority failed to acknowledge or discuss the exclusion of
other prospective African American jurors by the State in other cases.
Moreover, Justice Kavanaugh refused to indicate how he weighed the four
evidentiary factors leading to the Court’s decision, stating that “we need
not and do not decide that any of [these] four factors along would require
reversal.”241 Instead, Justice Kavanaugh emphasized that the extent of
racial discrimination in the instant case was due solely to the State’s
misconduct, which gave rise to a constitutional violation.
The majority should have expanded its analysis to include instances
of blatant discrimination by the State in prior proceedings to further bolster
its conclusion of the State’s felonious intent. Future defendants alleging
claims of discrimination by the State may not be comforted by the
majority’s decision because lower courts may limit its application to only
the facts of the particular proceeding, which may, in turn, impair a
defendant’s claim of discrimination. Moreover, Justice Kavanaugh should
have also indicated the weight he gave to each of the four factors to help
lower courts in assessing Batson challenges. In refusing to indicate how it
weighed the four evidentiary factors, future defendants and courts may not
know the point at which the facts demonstrate discrimination, which will
allow courts to apply their own standards for assessing Batson claims.
Although a bright-line rule for weighing evidentiary considerations may
impose restrictions, some guidance by the Court would have been helpful
for future defendants and courts to accurately assess a claim of
discrimination by the State. Thus, by limiting the application of Batson to
the facts of the instant case and refusing to give weight to any of the four
factors, the majority did nothing to clarify or strengthen Batson.
Further, as Justice Kavanaugh stated, the decision broke no new
legal ground. 242 The opinion merely reaffirmed the current legal standard
as legitimate, even though Batson has been heavily criticized for its lack of
238. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2243.
239. Id. at 2245.
240. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986).
241. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2236.
242. Id. at 2251.
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effectiveness. The majority only remedied the misconduct of one
prosecutor without fixing the entire system that has consistently allowed
the government to continue its discriminatory practice without
consequence. Consequently, aware of the persistent problems of
discrimination that have plagued jury selection, Justice Kavanaugh took no
steps to solve the inadequate and “toothless”243 tool designed to prevent
discriminatory strikes.
C. The Unresolved Issue of a Wayward Prosecutor
In reaching his decision, Justice Kavanaugh focused solely on the
four evidentiary issues the Court deemed relevant in determining whether
the prosecutor for the State, Doug Evans, violated Flowers’ constitutional
right by excluding a prospective African American juror from the sixth trial.
244
Yet, the majority failed to directly address the issue of prosecutorial
misconduct, even though the sole issue concerned the prosecutor’s unlawful
exercise of the contested strike. Prosecutorial misconduct undermines the
constitutional guarantee of a fair trial and legitimate judgments, as well as
hinders public confidence in the criminal justice system.245 By failing to
address the prosecutor’s determination to empanel an all Caucasian jury,
the majority allowed Evans to slip through the cracks of the justice system
and permitted him to continue his discriminatory practice.
First, the Court’s failure to address the issue of prosecutorial
misconduct inadvertently allows guilty prosecutors to avoid penalties for
their constitutional violations by failing to provide remedies to ensure that
prosecutors do not violate the law again. Prosecutors are endowed with
much power in the criminal justice system, and as such, judicial and
legislative safeguards are provided to ensure that they perform their duties
in accordance with established professional and ethical standards.
However, the current remedies for prosecutorial misconduct are largely
ineffective because of their inadequacy at disciplining offending
prosecutors. For example, in the rare event that an appellate court reverses
a defendant’s conviction for prosecutorial misconduct, the judicial opinion
fails to name the offending prosecutor. 246 Consequently, the majority did
nothing to protect future defendants from being tried by wrongdoing
prosecutors and contributed to the overall ineffectiveness of deterring such

243. Pollitt & Warren, supra note 73, at 1978.
244. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2236.
245. Bidish Sarma, Using Deterrence Theory to Promote Prosecutorial
Accountability, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 573, 577 (2017).
246. Morey, supra note 73, at 619.
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misconduct by allowing offending prosecutors to continue their practices at
the detriment of the people.
Second, by failing to provide an answer to the issue of prosecutorial
misconduct in the present case, the majority allowed Evans to continue his
discriminatory practices without consequence. The issue of prosecutorial
misconduct was not novel concept to the present case. In two instances
from the prior proceedings, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed
Flowers’ conviction for prosecutorial misconduct, and even found the State
to be engaged in discrimination against African American prospective
jurors.247 Despite the Mississippi Supreme Court finding proof of
prosecutorial misconduct on numerous occasions, Evans still remained the
lead prosecutor on the case throughout Flowers’ six trials.248
Notably, at oral argument of the present case, Justice Alito and
Sotomayor questioned the State as to why a single prosecutor was allowed
to try a case six times, instead of allowing the State Attorney General to
step in and try the case in a different county where the potential jurors
would not have had as many connections to the defendant.249 In response,
the State explained that Mississippi statutory law only allows the Attorney
General to assist upon request by the district attorney, and Doug Evans, the
prosecutor in the instant case, declined to do so.250 However, if the issue of
prosecutorial misconduct had been addressed by the courts from the
beginning, the instant case may not have required a finding of purposeful
discrimination and would have provided a remedy to hold guilty
prosecutors accountable for their constitutional violations.
Even if the Court had addressed the issue and reversed Flowers’
conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct, Evans’ may still continue
his discriminatory practices because such solutions have shown to be
ineffective. For example, Mississippians may exercise their democratic
power to elect a different district attorney and halt the misconduct adversely
affecting the county. However, this solution appears to be ineffective
because Evans ran unopposed in 2019, and thus allowed him to continue
his usage of racial discrimination in the exercise of a peremptory
247. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2235. Justice Kavanaugh explained that at Flowers’
first trial, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the conviction because of numerous
instances of prosecutorial misconduct. At the second trial, the trial court found that the
prosecutor discriminated against prospective African American jurors in exercising the
peremptory challenge. While Flowers’ was convicted, the Mississippi Supreme Court
reversed because of prosecutorial misconduct. Moreover, at the third trial, the
Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the conviction because the prosecution had
discriminated against African American prospective jurors. Id.
248. Id.
249. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 236, at 31:13-19.
250. Id. at 31:20-24.
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challenge.251 Importantly, though, Evans has recused himself from the
Flowers case and asked the Circuit Judge to appoint the Mississippi
attorney general’s office to the proceeding.252
Further, professional sanctions are ineffective at deterring
prosecutorial misconduct because in Mississippi, a lawyer who has engaged
in racial discrimination in jury selection is not likely to face any form of
professional discipline.253 Private actions appear to be ineffective as well
at resolving the issue of prosecutorial misconduct. Recently, a class action
lawsuit has been filed against Evans for his alleged violation of
constitutionally rights by excluding African Americans from serving on
juries.254 However, the Supreme Court established “absolute immunity”
for prosecutors in suits involving monetary damages for unlawful conduct
in court.255 Accordingly, in the absence of court intervention and effective
remedies for prosecutorial misconduct, prosecutors may overlook the
decision of the Court and continue their racial discriminatory practices in
exercising a peremptory challenge.
V. CONCLUSION
The extraordinary facts of Flowers v. Mississippi provided another
chance for the Supreme Court to rectify the persistent problem of racial
discrimination in jury selection and remedy the highly criticized tool
ostensibly designed to thwart against discriminatory strikes. Instead, the
Court simply reinforced the standard under Batson despite widespread
criticism of its failure to live up to its ideals of eradicating invidious
discrimination. Further, although the Court correctly held that the State
violated Flowers’ constitutional rights, the opinion did nothing to
disincentivize wayward prosecutors from employing the same
discriminatory practices. Without consequences, the dictates of the
251. Parker Yesko, Doug Evans Running Unopposed for Reelection, APM
REPORTS (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.apmreports.org/story/2019/03/05/doug-evansrunning-unopposed-for-reelection.
252. Parker Yesko, Evans Quits the Case, APM REPORTS (Jan. 6, 2020),
https://www.apmreports.org/story/2020/01/06/doug-evans-recusal-curtis-flowers-case.
253. Parker Yesko, Why Don’t Prosecutor’s Get Disciplined? APM REPORTS
(Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.apmreports.org/story/2018/09/18/why-dont-prosecutorsget-disciplined.
254. Compl. at 2, Attala County NAACP v. Evans, No. 4:19-CV-167-DMBJMV (N.D. Miss. 2019).
255. Parker Yesko, Doug Evans Sued for Using Race in Jury Selection, APM
REPORTS (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.apmreports.org/story/2019/11/18/doug-evanssued-for-using-race-in-jury-selection-naacp; see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
431 (1976).
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Fourteenth Amendment go unenforced and defendants and citizens are left
without protection from unlawful governmental forces.
To ensure protection of constitutional rights, the Supreme Court
should provide a more stringent standard and effective procedures for
assessing discriminatory peremptory strikes, such as imposing a higher
burden for prosecutors to overcome in providing a race-neutral explanation,
reviewing race-based peremptory strikes under the strict scrutiny standard,
or filming Batson hearings to lower appellate deference. Moreover, the
Court in Flowers should have addressed the issue of prosecutorial
misconduct because without penalties, discriminatory practices go
unchecked and allows future prosecutors to continue without fear of
punishment. Thus, without intervention by the Court, defendants and jurors
are left unprotected and the law is susceptible to regressing back to times
when the justice system overlooked the problem of invidious
discrimination.

